Project "Market Mechanisms for Agent Coordination (Auction-Based Coordination Systems)"
(scroll down for publications)
Auction-based coordination systems coordinate teams of agents, such as teams
of mobile robots that have to repeatedly reassign tasks among themselves as
they learn more about the terrain, as robots fail or as additional tasks get
introduced. Applications include environmental clean up, mine clearing, space
exploration and search and rescue. AI and robotics researchers had explored
auction-based coordination systems at least since the introduction of contract
networks but mostly from an experimental perspective. Auctions in economics
deal with competitive agents that often have long decision cycles, while
auction-based coordination systems deal with cooperative agents that often
must operate in real-time, which raises a completely different set of issues.
My collaborators and I created a theoretical foundation for auction-based
coordination systems that assign locations to agents (that then need to visit
these locations), allowing one to understand the behavior of these
auction-based coordination systems better and extend their capabilities. In
particular, we demonstrated the advantages of auction-based coordination
systems based on sequential single-item auctions. We exploited the fact that
such auction-based coordination systems perform a form of hill climbing search
to analyze their performance and improved them via methods such as rollouts,
bundle bids and regret clearing. We showed that they can - perhaps
surprisingly - provide constant-factor quality guarantees in some cases even
though they run in polynomial time and, more generally, that they combine
advantageous properties of parallel and combinatorial auctions. We generalized
them to assign more than one additional location during each round, which
increases their similarity to combinatorial auctions. We showed that, for a
given number of additional locations to be assigned during each round, every
agent needs to submit only a constant number of bids per round and the runtime
of winner determination is linear in the number of agents. Thus, the
communication and winner determination times do not depend on the number of
locations, which helps the resulting auction-based coordination systems to
scale up to many locations for small bundle sizes. We also developed other
auction-based coordination systems, such as ones based on sequential
incremental-value auctions.
Tutorial
Representative Overview Publications
- S. Koenig, P. Keskinocak and C. Tovey. Progress on Agent Coordination with Cooperative Auctions [Senior Member Paper]. In AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2010. [downloadable]
- S. Koenig, C. Tovey, M. Lagoudakis, V. Markakis, D. Kempe, P. Keskinocak, A. Kleywegt, A. Meyerson and S. Jain. The Power of Sequential Single-Item Auctions for Agent Coordination [Nectar Paper]. In AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 1625-1629, 2006. [downloadable]
Representative Publications on Auctions
- X. Zheng and S. Koenig. Sequential Incremental-Value Auctions. In AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2010. [downloadable]
- A. Ekici, P. Keskinocak and S. Koenig. Multi-Robot Routing with Linear Decreasing Rewards over Time. In IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA), 958-963, 2009. [downloadable]
- K. Daniel and S. Koenig. Fast Winner Determination for Agent Coordination with SBB Auctions [Short Paper]. In International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), 1197-1198, 2009. [downloadable]
- S. Koenig, X. Zheng, C. Tovey, R. Borie, P. Kilby, V. Markakis and P. Keskinocak. Agent Coordination with Regret Clearing. In AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 101-107, 2008. [downloadable]
- S. Koenig, C. Tovey, X. Zheng and I. Sungur. Sequential Bundle-Bid Single-Sale Auction Algorithms for Decentralized Control. In International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 1359-1365, 2007. [downloadable]
- J. Melvin, P. Keskinocak, S. Koenig, C. Tovey and B. Yuksel Ozkaya. Multi-Robot Routing with Rewards and Disjoint Time Windows. In IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS), 2332-2337, 2007. [downloadable]
- X. Zheng, S. Koenig and C. Tovey. Improving Sequential Single-Item Auctions. In IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS), 2238-2244, 2006. [downloadable]
- C. Tovey, M. Lagoudakis, S. Jain and S. Koenig. The Generation of Bidding Rules for Auction-Based Robot Coordination. In Multi-Robot Systems: From Swarms to Intelligent Automata, L. Parker, F. Schneider and A. Schultz (editor), volume 3 of 3-14. Springer, 2005. [downloadable]
- M. Lagoudakis, V. Markakis, D. Kempe, P. Keskinocak, S. Koenig, A. Kleywegt, C. Tovey, A. Meyerson and S. Jain. Auction-Based Multi-Robot Routing. In International Conference on Robotics: Science and Systems (ROBOTICS), 343-350, 2005. [downloadable]
- M. Lagoudakis, M. Berhault, S. Koenig, P. Keskinocak and A. Kleywegt. Simple Auctions with Performance Guarantees for Multi-Robot Task Allocation. In IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS), 698-705, 2004. [downloadable]
- M. Berhault, H. Huang, P. Keskinocak, S. Koenig, W. Elmaghraby, P. Griffin and A. Kleywegt. Robot Exploration with Combinatorial Auctions. In IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS), 1957-1962, 2003. [downloadable]
Representative Publications on Techniques other than Auctions
- H. Xu, S. Kumar, D. Johnke, N. Ayanian and S. Koenig. SAGL: A New Heuristic for Multi-Robot Routing with Complex Tasks. In IEEE International Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence (ICTAI), 530-535, 2016. [downloadable]
- X. Zheng and S. Koenig. Generalized Reaction Functions for Solving Complex-Task Allocation Problems. In International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 478-483, 2011. [downloadable]
- X. Zheng and S. Koenig. Market-Based Algorithms for Allocating Complex Tasks [Student Abstract]. In AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2010. [downloadable]
- X. Zheng and S. Koenig. K-Swaps: Cooperative Negotiation for Solving Task-Allocation Problems. In International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 373-379, 2009. [downloadable]
- X. Zheng and S. Koenig. Negotiation with Reaction Functions for Solving Complex Task Allocation Problems. In IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS), 4811-4816, 2009. [downloadable]
- X. Zheng and S. Koenig. Reaction Functions for Task Allocation to Cooperative Agents. In International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), 559-566, 2008. [downloadable]
- X. Zheng and S. Koenig. Greedy Approaches for Solving Task-Allocation Problems with Coalitions. In AAMAS-08 Workshop on Formal Models and Methods for Multi-Robot Systems, 35-40, 2008. [downloadable]
Some of this material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Army
Research Office under contract/grant number W911NF-08-1-0468, by the National Science
Foundation under Grant No. 0413196 and 0113881 as well as a seed grant by
NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsoring organizations.
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publishers do not want authors to make their papers available electronically
after the papers have been published. Please use the electronic versions
provided here only if hardcopies are not yet available. If you have comments
on any of these papers, please send me an email! Also, please send me your
papers if we have common interests.
This page was automatically created by a bibliography maintenance system that
was developed as part of an undergraduate research project, advised by Sven Koenig.
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